This paper investigates the long-run economic e¤ects of large natural resource endowments, through a comparative quantitative case study. Focusing on three economic features of the so-called Nordic model, namely low income inequality, high labour productivity growth, and high welfare spending, this study estimates the shocks to these key features in Norway after the country became one of the world's largest oil exporters. A synthetic control unit constructed by weighting Nordic countries that closely resemble the economy of Norway without being oil producers provides the most reliable comparison unit to estimate the causal e¤ects constituting the paper's threefold contribution. First, results show that the resource windfall contributed to relatively higher top income shares, adding natural resources to the set of drivers of income inequality in Norway. Second, the resource windfall boosted labour productivity.
I. Introduction
The aim of this research is to econometrically estimate the response of three economic features of the so-called Nordic model (namely low income inequality, high productivity growth and high welfare spending) for Norway, after the country became one of the world's largest oil exporters. In other words, this paper provides a quantitative comparative case study which can highlight the robustness of the key features of the Nordic model when subjected to a substantial structural shock. In doing so, this paper complements previous studies with a similar methodology, such as Mideksa (2013) and Larsen (2006) , which analyze the impact of the resource windfall, focusing mostly on the Norwegian GDP per capita.
The supposed exceptionality of the Nordic model has been analyzed, questioned, and tested by scholars (among others, Lane et al., 1993) with regard to a variety of aspects, with egalitarianism of the wealth distribution getting the most attention. Fochesato and Bowles (2015) attempted to measure the relative egalitarian performance of the Nordic economies by comparing their level of material wealth inequality with respect to a large group of economies over the past three thousand years. Their conclusion is that the Nordic economies do not produce a more egalitarian distribution of material wealth than, for example, some horticultural and forager economies, although they show a higher level of intergenerational and social mobility. Barth et al. (2014) provide a theoretical overview of the main political and economic features of the Nordic open economies, summarizing and putting together results from previous economic research on the issue: Moene et al. (1993) , Moene and Wallerstein (1997) and Barth et al. (2013) .
This research follows Barth et al. (2014) in representing the Nordic model as a set of three distinct but interconnected mechanisms. These are: (i) collective bargaining which leads to labour wage compression (i.e., high minimum wages and low maximum wages) through a combination of central wage negotiations and local wage negotiations at the …rm level; (ii) high labour productivity which, combined with wage compression, stimulates high private investments and creation of new highly productive enterprises; (iii) political support for large ratios of public welfare spending to GDP. The scope of the present study is to brie ‡y review and empirically test the robustness of each of these mechanisms, by comparing Norway to the other Nordic economies.
In order to observe a wholly hypothetical counterfactual, the treatment (i.e., the resource windfall) would ideally impact only a unit or a subgroup of the four Nordic economies (i.e., Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) representing the full sample of this study. For this reason, the donor pool provided by the untreated countries represents the perfect sample in order to construct a counterfactual that matches the treated country. The countries of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, closely resembling the economy of Norway without being oil producers 1 , therefore provide the most reliable donor pool of comparison units. The Synthetic Control Method (SCM, hereafter) is implemented to assign weights to the countries of the donor pool, in order to obtain a synthetic control unit that is subsequently used to estimate the causal e¤ects constituting the paper's threefold contribution.
First, results show that the windfall contributed to a lower degree of wage compression, measured by higher top income shares relative to the Nordic neigh-1. Figure 1 in Corak (2013) shows that the four Nordic economies of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland have in common a remarkably low level of income inequality (measured as the Gini coe¢ cient) jointly with a high degree of intergenerational economic mobility (measured as the elasticity between parental and children's earnings).
bors. This …nding adds natural resources to the set of variables that explain the increase in income inequality in Norway documented in the economic literature, and summarized in Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) .
Second, the treatment boosted labour productivity, regardless of the increased income inequality. This covariation of increased inequality and boosted productivity contradicts the theoretical model in Barth et al. (2014) , which implies that a lower degree of wage compression would slow down the dynamic process of creative destruction and hence lead to lower labour productivity in the end.
Third, results indicate that the treatment, via the large increase in resource revenues, contributed to …nancing a steadily increasing gap in the degree of welfare generosity 2 between Norway and the other Nordic countries, with an increase in generosity in Norway. This result is not in line with the prediction that overall welfare generosity in Norway should decrease in response to a higher level of income inequality; that prediction is based on the political reinforcement hypothesis in , although their model relies on the assumption of a given exposure to the risk of income losses, which is no longer the case when the resource sector is taken into account. The result of an increasing gap in the overall degree of welfare generosity post-treatment can be explained by the volatile income streams in the resource sector, which increase individuals' exposure to the risk of income losses and hence foster the voters' preferences for public spending and welfare generosity. In addition, resource revenues enlarged the tax base through the post-treatment years, allowing the Norwegian government to …nance a sustained level of overall welfare generosity. Sensitivity tests through in-time-placebo tests and di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations have been conducted throughout the paper, in order to con…rm the validity of 2. Generosity scores for social insurance programs in the four Nordic countries are derived from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set in Scruggs (2014) and Scruggs et al. (2014). these results.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the windfall that accrued to the Norwegian economy, Section 3 analyzes the causal e¤ects on the labour market and on income inequality, Section 4 presents the e¤ects on the dynamics of productivity and private investments, whilst Section 5 focuses on the e¤ects on public welfare spending. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
II. The resource windfall
This paper considers the jump in Norway's total production of petroleum above the threshold of 50 million standard cubic meter (Sm^3) oil equivalents (i.e., including oil, condensate, NGL and gas), which happened in 1980, as the treatment; this was the start of the oil adventure that caused a structural change in the Norwegian economy without substantially a¤ecting the other Nordic coun- Mideksa (2013) estimated the causal comparative e¤ect of natural resource endowment on the level of the Norwegian GDP per capita. Results in Mideksa (2013) show that about 20% of the Norwegian annual GDP per capita increase in the post-windfall period 1971 2007 can be attributed to the petroleum endowment.
Although extraction started in 1971, as plotted in Figure 1 , the fact that the impact of extraction on income and GDP did not signi…cantly appear until a few years later (as documented in Larsen, 2006, and Mideksa, 2013) , justi…es the choice of the treatment year.
The intuition behind the empirical analysis of this paper is that becoming a main oil exporter signi…cantly modi…es the structure and performance of labour market institutions that determine income inequality, productivity and investment dynamics, as well as public welfare spending through higher resource revenues. The research question then becomes: did oil extraction and the related structural changes determine a new path for the Norwegian economy (measured by three main mechanisms), signi…cantly di¤erent from those of her Nordic neighbors? Whether the answer is a¢ rmative or negative, the results of this paper o¤er additional empirical evidence on the Nordic model's relevance as an analytical framework.
III. Labour market and income inequality
The economic literature related to the dispersion of wage earnings, income inequality and labour market institutions (summarized in the survey by Salverda and Checchi, 2013) , introduces the context for the …rst empirical exercise of this paper: how has the oil windfall impacted the wage structure and more broadly the degree of income inequality in Norway, compared to the Nordic neighbors?
First, I will provide some qualitative predictions by applying the model in Barth et al. (2014) to the current context with a booming resource sector.
An initial high degree of wage compression attracts foreign companies due to the lower upper bound they will be able to o¤er to high-skilled labour in the oil sector, as compared to the hypothetical upper bound for the same highskilled worker in other countries. This leads ceteris paribus to higher expected pro…ts for the representative extracting company and hence boosts investment opportunities. In turn, increased labour demand in the resource sector of the economy causes a jump in the whole range of resource sector wages, which is not fully re ‡ected in the wage dynamics of the rest of the economy due to institutional constraints, at least at …rst 4 . Hence, this determines a lower degree of wage compression in the labour force as a whole after the treatment and, for given capital incomes, higher top income shares (considered as the key drivers of income inequality 5 ). Note that substantial upward wage adjustments for highskilled workers might also be justi…ed in case of perfect mobility of labour in the oil sector across countries, leading to the above-mentioned jump in the whole range of resource sector wages 6 .
Some caveats about the identifying assumption (i.e., the fact that no other important factors but the expansion of the resource sector have impacted the treated unit) are relevant here. The causal e¤ect of the treatment on top income inequality in Norway, which will be estimated below, might also be partially explained by additional factors that are not related to the treatment, such as tax reforms and the deregulation of …nancial markets. Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) , for instance, identify the implementation of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform as a decisive factor leading to a sharp increase in capital income (dividends and capital gains) received by households, which in turn boosted inequality of the income distribution. In order to partially take into account these possible limitations, the dependent variable considered in the analysis below will be given 4. This wage in ‡ation mechanism in the Norwegian resource sector has been closely analyzed in Dyrstad (2015) . 5. A methodological discussion about whether and how high top income shares translate into high concentration of power can be found in Aaberge et al. (2013) .
6. The causal e¤ect of treatment on unemployment rates can be ambiguous but it will not be explicitly tested in this study. On the one hand, boosted labour demand in the resource sector might reduce unemployment rates with respect to the neighboring countries, although this positive could be mitigated or even canceled by migration ‡ows from the other Nordic countries to Norway. On the other hand, the uncertain resource income due to high variance of the resource price for oil might lead to lower investments at times and hence relatively higher unemployment rates.
by top income shares, excluding capital gains. Another question is to what extent the liberalization of …nancial markets, which created strong incentives to shift labour income to capital income, was an exclusive feature of the Norwegian economy compared to the Nordic neighbors. Bjorklund et al. (1995) estimated that Sweden also experienced a signi…cant increase in income inequality in the period 1989 1991 due to a boost in capital gains that resulted from changes in the tax legislation. For Finland, Riihelä et al. (2008) claim that the increase in inequality at the high end of the income distribution observed over the period 1990 2004 can be seen as a consequence of the 1993 Finnish tax reform which introduced the so-called Nordic dual income tax model. Similar tax reforms took place in Denmark in 1994, as highlighted in Fritzell et al. (2011) . Hence, to the extent that these changes in …nancial and tax legislation in Scandinavia did not exclusively concern the Norwegian economy, they do not invalidate the identifying assumption of this paper.
III.A. The …rst empirical exercise
The SCM has been implemented in Abadie et al. (2010) , Abadie et al. (2011) and Abadie et al. (2015) , in order to estimate the causal e¤ect of policies or shocks, as the di¤erence between the outcome for the actual treated unit and the predicted outcome of the synthetic control unit, constructed by weighting the units of the donor pool. The aim of this exercise is to apply the SCM in order to test whether the prediction of higher top income shares for Norway 2015) , the synthetic control unit is given by the convex combination of weights W = (w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) with w 2 + w 3 + w 4 = 1, chosen in order to minimize the weighted sum of the squared di¤erences
v m represents the relative importance of each predictor.
The implementation of the SCM assigns the following weights to the coun-7. The time series of wage dispersion (d9=d1) would also qualify as a relevant dependent variable for this exercise; however, data for the whole time range of this empirical exercise (1960 2009) were not available.
8. UTIP-UNIDO industrial pay-inequality (further details in the Data Appendix) is an indicator of industrial wage dispersion and hence can be considered as a good proxy for top income shares, thereby contributing to the e¢ cacy of matching the treated and synthetic control unit in the pre-treatment period.
tries of the donor pool 9 :
(1)
Country Synthetic control weights W Denmark 0
Hence, the synthetic control unit is a linear combination of two countries of the donor pool, speci…cally Finland (0:272) and Sweden (0:728). The zero weight assigned to Denmark is not su¢ cient to justify the exclusion of this country from the donor pool, for two reasons. First, dropping a zero weight country a posteriori does not improve the quality of the estimation. Secondly, a zero weight only means that the speci…c country is relatively less powerful in resembling the predictors of the treated unit in the pre-treatment country.
More generally (and di¤erently from an OLS regression), a synthetic weight indicates the explanatory power of a unit relative to others, rather than its absolute explanatory power 10 .
De…ne Y jt as the top 5% income shares for country j = 1; :::; 4 at time t. The weights presented in (1) can then be used to construct the synthetic control unit given by The averaged values for each of the predictors, for both the treated unit and the synthetic unit, can be found in Table 2 in the appendix. Further details about the algorithm of the Synthetic Control Method can be found in Abadie et al. (2011) and Abadie et al. (2015) . The statistical software package "Synth" is available online at http://stanford.edu/~jhain/software.htm#Synth 10. In order to observe a study in which most of the units included in the construction of the synthetic unit receive a zero weight, see Abadie et al. (2010) , page 500, This result seems to con…rm the qualitative predictions of higher income inequality described above, although the magnitude of this increased inequality is on average within an income share of 5%. To what extent can this result partly be explained by the 1992 Norwegian tax reform? As explained above, tax reforms from the 1990s do not invalidate the identifying assumption because 11. As documented in Aaberge et al. (2013) , the exceptionally high peak of top income shares in 2005 is due to the anticipation of a new tax on dividends introduced in 2006 by the Norwegian tax authorities. they were contemporaneously implemented in all the countries constituting the sample of this study. However, it cannot be excluded that the same tax reform impacted the countries di¤erently and caused a stronger jump in income inequality for Norway. In any case, the results of this empirical exercise can be seen as complementary to the analysis in Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) , because they add the booming resource sector to the group of explanatory variables underlying the actual jump in Norwegian income inequality (both in absolute terms as in Aaberge and Atkinson, 2010 , and with respect to the Nordic neighbors as in the current study).
When it comes to robustness checks, a weakness of the SCM is that no con…dence intervals are produced in order to test the statistical power of the synthetic unit. However, robustness checks can be done by conducting in-time placebo tests and more traditional di¤erence-in-di¤erences exercises. In-time placebo tests consist of reassigning the treatment to a year before or after the large increase in oil extraction activity actually took place in Norway. In the case of a treatment year earlier than 1980 -for example, 1970 -the shorter pre-treatment period over which predictors are averaged might result in a less powerful set of synthetic weights. These in-time placebo tests were conducted for di¤erent treatment years both before and after 1980; they validate the main results of Figure 2 by showing no signi…cant changes in the predictive power of the synthetic control unit 12 .
In order to provide more robustness checks, a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences exercise was conducted:
(2) T op5% j;t = j + t + T j;t + X 0 j;t + j;t where T op5% j;t stands for the top 5% income share of country j; j is a country Table 3 in the appendix); and j;t are country-clustered error terms. The OLS estimate of the coe¢ cient will then represent the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator of the causal e¤ect of the treatment.
As shown in Table 3 (in the appendix), the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator of the causal e¤ect of oil production on top income shares for Norway does not reject the main results of Figure 2 ; neither does it provide additional insights.
The coe¢ cient is positive, although weakly signi…cant when controlling for key labour market features of the Nordic countries -for instance, trade union density.
What does the treatment, combined with this result of slightly increased income inequality, imply for the dynamics of productivity and investments in Norway compared to her Nordic neighbors? This question is addressed in the following section.
IV. Productivity and investments
How does a booming resource sector in Norway in ‡uence the path of innovation, productivity, and investments, compared to the other Nordic countries?
We begin with a straightforward prediction of the direct e¤ect of the treatment on private investments and productivity growth. The booming resource sector initially implies huge capitalist investments and creation of new enterprises, hence boosting private investments for Norway relative to the other Nordic countries. These new, high value-added enterprises in the resource sector imply a substantial jump in productivity levels.
However, there is also an indirect channel. In their theory of creative destruction and wage compression, Barth et al. (2014) emphasize that a high initial degree of wage compression might function as a tax on low-productivity …rms (due to the high salaries for low-skilled human capital) and as a subsidy for high-productivity …rms (due to the low salaries for high-skilled human capital), leading to higher expected pro…ts for the high-productivity …rms, and hence fostering innovation and new investments through the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. In turn, new private investments raise the demand for labour and the equilibrium wages for a constant employment level.
More importantly, this process leads to a higher number of workers employed in high-productivity …rms, which implies an overall higher average level of labour productivity.
Now, how does this positive wage compression-productivity multiplier work in the context of this study? Given the result of the …rst empirical exercise above (i.e., higher income inequality in Norway), the prediction based on Barth et al. As shown in Table 4 (in the appendix), in Norway, the treatment causes a jump of 6 to 12:5 USD (constant 2010 USD, PPPs) in GDP per hour worked, which is statistically signi…cant as well. In other words, the take-home message from this exercise con…rms that the supposed indirect negative e¤ect of the treatment on productivity via increased income inequality is outweighed by the positive boost to average productivity induced by private investments in the resource sector.
To the extent that these preliminary results can be generalized, the …ndings of increased income inequality and boosted productivity do not seem to vali- 
V. The dynamics of welfare spending
The focus of this section will be on the Nordic countries as providers of public services and social insurance, for instance, unemployment and sickness insurance, health expenditure and pensions. How does a booming resource sector in Norway in ‡uence the growth of welfare spending relative to its Nordic neighbors? In other words, does the structural change implied by the treatment, jointly with the higher income inequality observed above, imply a shift to less or more welfare generosity in Norway?
At …rst, let us brie ‡y review the recent literature. The Nordic model benchmark described in Barth et al. (2014) and demonstrates that wage compression might boost productivity and raise average wages, which in turn leads to increased demand for welfare spending and a shift to the left (i.e., higher welfare generosity) of the entire political spectrum. Let us see in more detail how this happens. In Barth et al. (2014) and , both income level and the marginal bene…t of public services determine the voter's preferences for welfare spending. The authors show that, for a given exposure to the risk of income loss, higher income (i.e., higher equilibrium wage induced by higher average labour productivity) increases the demand for welfare spending (i.e., welfare spending is assumed to be a normal good). This is due to the fact that, as voters become richer, the income loss associated with a less generous welfare state gets larger, whilst the utility cost necessary to …nance welfare programs gets smaller. Hence, these modi…ed preferences move both the right and left political parties toward a new equilibrium with a more generous welfare state. focus on changes in the income distribution (for a given mean income) and the consequent shift in preferences for generous welfare spending. They hypothesize that, for voters below the mean, an increase in income inequality reduces their willingness to …nance welfare, hence leading to a shift toward the political right and less welfare generosity; they label this the political reinforcement hypothesis.
Now, how will these theoretical predictions survive the third empirical exercise? It has to be pointed out that the empirical analysis below does not aim at precisely testing the predictions of the above models, for a simple reason. The results of Barth et al. (2014) , and build on the assumption of a given exposure to the risk of income losses, which does not hold when the treatment is de…ned to be the volatile booming resource sector of Norway. In other words, the evidence below regarding the causal e¤ect of treatment on welfare generosity can build on two counteracting e¤ects: (i)
for a given exposure to the risk of income losses (as in Barth et al., 2014 , treatment causes wage dispersion and higher income inequality, less demand for social insurance and in turn a lower overall degree of welfare generosity; (ii) a booming resource sector with high but volatile income streams increases the exposure to the risk of income loss, and hence increases support for public spending and a high overall degree of welfare generosity. Which one of these e¤ects prevails in the third empirical exercise?
V.A. The third empirical exercise
The set-up of this last empirical exercise resembles the …rst one, with Norway Quite similarly to the weights assigned in the …rst empirical exercise, Finland 13. The averaged values for each of the predictors, for both the treated unit and the synthetic unit, can be found in Table 5 It is relevant to issue certain caveats here, when it comes to the economic interpretation of this result. As is the case for a causal inference analysis conducted through the SCM, in which there is no need to select and precisely measure the treatment, other decisive factors might also have contributed to the main result shown in Figure 4 , for instance, political reforms of social insurance programs. More research is needed on the issue and speci…cally on the confounding factors underlying the result shown in Figure 4 . However, and to the extent that we can claim that the gap in welfare generosity observed in Figure 4 has been fostered by the huge resource revenues received by Norway from the 1980s onward, the intuition behind this result is the following. There is no evidence of decreased overall welfare generosity in Norway in response to a higher level of income inequality, as predicted for instance by the political reinforcement hypothesis in (although their model relies on the assumption of a given exposure to the risk of income losses). More likely, the volatile income streams of the resource sector increased the exposure to the risk of income loss, and hence fostered the voters'preferences for public spending and welfare generosity. In addition, resource revenues as well the tax base enlarged through the post-treatment years, allowing the Norwegian government to …nance a sustained level of overall welfare generosity.
Before turning to the concluding remarks, a few robustness checks for this last empirical exercise should be mentioned. In-time placebo tests were conducted here as well, for di¤erent treatment years throughout the range of years 1985 1990, with no signi…cant changes in the predictive power of the synthetic control unit 14 . In addition, and for the sake of consistency with the previous empirical exercises, a more traditional di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation was set up:
in which CGI j;t is de…ned as the score of the combined generosity index of welfare programs (1971 2010) for country j; j and t estimate respectively countries' …xed e¤ects and time …xed e¤ects; D j;t is a dummy for the interaction of the treated country with the post-treatment period; 0 j;t includes a set of covariates (replacement rates and program coverage for each of the three programs); and j;t are error terms adjusted for country clustering.
As shown in Table 6 (in the appendix), the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator of the causal e¤ect of the treatment on the combined generosity index, represented by the coe¢ cient , is positive and is signi…cant in most of the regressions with controls. This con…rms the main result of increased overall welfare generosity in Norway in response to the treatment.
VI. Concluding remarks
How has a large natural resource windfall impacted the dynamics of income inequality, productivity dynamics and welfare spending in Norway? This was the aim of this research, which econometrically estimates the dynamics of the three main economic features of the so-called Nordic model for the case of Norway, after the country became one of the world's largest oil exporters. The identifying assumption relies on the fact that Denmark, Finland and Sweden, which closely resemble the economy of Norway, are not oil producers; hence they 14. Results are available in the appendix, and are shown in Figures 4a and 4b. provide the most reliable donor pool of comparison units.
The main results are summarized as follows, together with some considerations for future research. The …rst empirical exercise showed that the windfall contributed to a lower degree of wage compression in Norway, measured by slightly higher top income shares relative to the Nordic neighbors. However, the magnitude of this e¤ect is not large, and hence shows the need for further research employing di¤erent indicators of wage dispersion and income inequality. Still, this …nding makes a contribution by adding resource revenues to the set of factors explaining the increased income inequality in Norway that has been documented in Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) . Secondly, increased private investments in the high value-added resource sector clearly boosted labour productivity, despite the increased income inequality. The relevance of this otherwise predictable …nding is that the covariation between increased inequality and boosted productivity does not coincide with the theoretical prediction of the model in Barth et al. (2014) , in which lower wage compression would slow down the dynamic process of creative destruction and hence labour productivity.
Here, as well, further (empirical and theoretical) research is needed to further investigate the mechanisms at work. Thirdly, results show that the streams of resource revenues contributed to …nancing a steadily increasing gap in the degree of welfare generosity (measured by the combined generosity index) in which Norway's generosity pulled ahead of the other Nordic countries. More importantly, this …nding is not in the line with the prediction of a decreased overall welfare generosity in Norway in response to a higher level of income inequality, as in the study of . As highlighted in the paper, other decisive factors might also have contributed to this result, for instance, political reforms in public service provision and social insurance programs. More research at both the individual and cross-country levels is surely needed. Regardless of the pos-sibility of confounding factors, the result of the third empirical exercise clearly shows no evidence of decreased overall welfare generosity in Norway. Instead, the results support the hypothesis that a windfall of resource revenues enlarged the tax base, allowing the Norwegian government to …nance a sustained level of overall welfare generosity. In line with this last result, it can be pointed out that the results of this paper mainly show that the windfall has provided an opportunity to sustain the generosity of the welfare policies of Norway, rather than diminishing it.
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